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Insurance
by Stephen M. Schatz*
Stephen L. Cotter**
and Bradley S. Wolff**
I.

INTRODUCTION

For the second year in a row, Georgia appellate courts have emphasized that even if the slightest doubt exists as to whether a liability
insurance policy provides coverage for a loss, an insurer should provide
a defense to the insured for the lawsuit or face potentially detrimental
consequences out of the insurer's control, which the insurer will have
little or no ability to alter after a judgment has been rendered against
the insured. Several other recent decisions have made significant
changes to insurance law as well. Some of the decisions indicate that it
is becoming increasingly difficult for an insurer to prevail on the defense
of a lack of timely notice as a matter of law. In other cases, the courts
have interpreted the phrases "arising out of" and "using" in insurance
policies very broadly to find coverage. In one interesting case, a divided
court of appeals upheld the enforceability of appraisal provisions in auto
policies, distinguishing them from invalid arbitration clauses and further

* Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Virginia (B.A., with distinction, 1985); University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1988). Member, State Bar of Georgia (Member, Tort and
Insurance Practice and Litigation); Defense Research Institute.
** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1974). Member, Mercer Law Review (1973-1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia;
American Bar Association; Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; Defense Research
Institute; International Association of Defense Counsel.
*** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., cum laude, 1983); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
Member, State Bar of Georgia; Defense Research Institute; International
1986).
Association of Defense Counsel.
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held that an insurer's payment of the appraised value of the auto
precluded claims of fraud, breach of contract, and RICO violations.
In other insurance developments, Georgia's Insurance Commissioner
promulgated emergency regulations barring an insurance company from
using a twelve-month suit limitation and imposing two years as the
minimum time for bringing suit on a policy. These emergency regulations have changed the longstanding prior practice that had been
consistently enforced by the courts.
II.

COMMERCIAL LIABILITY INSURANCE

A. Insurers Can Be Bound By Acts of DualAgent and Have Duty to
Defend Even Though Undisputed Facts Show No Duty to Indemnify
In Yeomans & Associates Agency, Inc. v. Bowen Thee Surgeons, Inc.,'
the Georgia Court of Appeals tackled two noteworthy issues: (1) an
agent's relationship to an insurer under the dual agency doctrine and (2)
an insurer's duty to defend an insured against groundless allegations,
even though it is undisputed that the company will have no duty to
indemnify under the policy at the conclusion of the lawsuit.' The
insured, Bowen, and its employee, Black, were sued for Black's alleged
negligence in causing a collision. The suit alleged that Black was acting
within the scope of his employment at the time of the collision, making
Bowen liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. However, the
undisputed "true fact" was that Black was driving his own car on
personal business outside the scope of his employment when the collision
occurred. Bowen provided notice of the lawsuit to its independent
insurance agency, Yeomans. Bowen had auto liability insurance and
commercial general liability insurance. The agent notified the auto
liability carrier of the suit but did not provide any notice to the
commercial general liability carrier, Canal Indemnity Company. In the
past, when Yeomans received a claim from Bowen that could be covered
under Canal's policy, Yeomans would forward the claim to the brokerage
firm that had issued the policy on behalf of Canal, and the brokerage
firm would then send the claim to Canal. In this case, however, Canal
did not receive notice from Yeomans and therefore did not provide a
defense for this lawsuit. In addition, the auto liability carrier disclaimed
coverage.3 As a result, the trial court entered a default judgment
against Bowen and Black. Bowen then filed suit against Yeomans and

1. 274 Ga. App. 738, 618 S.E.2d 673 (2005).
2. Id. at 740-42, 618 S.E.2d at 677-78.
3. Id. at 738-40, 618 S.E.2d at 675-76.
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Canal for failing to provide coverage and a defense, seeking the amount
of the default judgment plus attorney fees and bad faith penalties. After
a jury trial, the court entered a judgment against Yeomans and Canal
for joint and several liability in the amount of $1,550,000. 4
With respect to the dual agency doctrine, Canal contended that it was
entitled to a directed verdict because no agency relationship existed
between Canal and Yeomans.5 The court disagreed, holding that the
evidence presented at trial justified the jury finding an agency relationship between Yeomans and Canal.6 The court also held that Canal
received constructive notice of the claim because Yeomans received
notice of the claim from Bowen.' The court so ruled despite the fact
that, as Judge Andrews pointed out in his dissent (joined by Judge
Johnson), Yeomans had no contractual relationship with Canal
Instead,
authorizing Yeomans to accept notice on Canal's behalf.'
Yeomans had a contract with Canal's broker, had obtained coverage only
through the broker and not through Canal directly, and in the past had
sent notices of claims to the broker, not Canal.' In ruling in Bowman's
favor, the court focused on Yeomans's role as a dual agent for the
insured and insurer.' ° Because the evidence demonstrated that
Yeomans had accepted premiums and notices of claims on Canal's behalf
in the past, and because no evidence indicated that Canal had ever
objected to this "custom," a jury question existed as to the extent of
Yeomans's authorization to accept notices of claims on Canal's behalf "as
a fiduciary and a dual agent."1'
Yeomans has serious potential ramifications for insurers who disclaim
coverage on the basis of the insured's breach of the timely notice
condition. If there is even the slightest indication that an independent
agent has sent notice or premiums to the insurer or the insurer's broker
in the past which were accepted by the insurer without any objection,

4. Id. at 740-41, 618 S.E.2d at 676-77. Canal's exposure was limited under the
judgment to $1 million based upon prior agreement with the plaintiff. Id. at 741 n.2, 618
S.E.2d at 677 n.2.
5. Id. at 746, 618 S.E.2d at 680. The court of appeals had previously held that Canal
was not entitled to summary judgment on this same issue in Bowen Tree Surgeons, Inc. v.
Canal Indemnity Co., 264 Ga. App. 520, 591 S.E.2d 415 (2003), which was discussed in our
2004 insurance survey article. See Stephen M. Schatz, Bradley S. Wolff & Stephen L.
Cotter, Insurance, 56 MERCER L. REV. 253, 269 (2004).
6. Yeomans, 274 Ga. App. at 746, 618 S.E.2d at 680.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 754, 618 S.E.2d at 685 (Andrews, P.J., dissenting).
9. Id., 618 S.E.2d at 685-86.
10. Yeomans, 274 Ga. App. at 746, 618 S.E.2d at 680.
11. Id. at 745-46, 618 S.E.2d at 680.
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then the court will likely conclude that a question of fact exists as to
whether the agent is a dual agent. Under such circumstances, insurers
would be better served by providing a defense under a reservation of
rights and bringing a declaratory judgment action on the issue of
whether any agency relationship exists. If the jury concludes that an
agency relationship exists, then the insurer can pursue a separate action
against the
agent for its failure to provide the insurer actual notice of
12
the claim.
With respect to the second issue-an insurer's broad duty to defend its
insured-Canal's policy excluded bodily injury that arose out of the use
of an automobile by any "insured" ("the auto exclusion"). The policy
defined "insured" as an employee of the named insured (Bowen) if the
employee (Black) was acting within the scope of his employment at the
time of the "occurrence" (the collision). It was undisputed that Black
was not acting within the scope of his employment with Bowen at the
time of the collision and was not an "insured" under the policy."
Therefore, the court concluded that the auto exclusion did not apply, and
Canal had a duty to defend Bowen because the plaintiffs had alleged
bodily injury caused by an occurrence in their complaint.1 4 The court
so held despite the fact that none of this would be at issue if the
underlying case had not gone into default. If there were no default
judgment, Bowen would not have been liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, and therefore Canal would have had no duty to
indemnify Bowen under the policy." In doing so, the court emphasized
that an insurer's duty to defend is separate from its duty to indemnify
under the policy, and the insurer must consider whether the alleged
claim falls within policy coverages, regardless of whether the insured
could actually be held liable to the plaintiffs.1 6 Also important to the
court's decision was the insurer's duty to conduct a "reasonable
investigation" into the insured's contentions to determine whether a duty
to defend had been triggered. 7 Therefore, even though the four corners

12. For a good discussion of the dual agency doctrine in Georgia, see Home Materials,
Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 250 Ga. 599, 300 S.E.2d 139 (1983). "Dual agency is
proper where the agency is known to the principals and the principals do not repudiate it.
Further, dual agency does not in and of itself relieve the agent of responsibility to either
of the principals." Id. at 602, 300 S.E.2d at 142.
13. Yeomans, 274 Ga. App. at 742, 618 S.E.2d at 678.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 742-43, 618 S.E.2d at 678.
16. Id. at 742, 618 S.E.2d at 678 (citing Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am. Veterans,
224 Ga. App. 557, 563, 481 S.E.2d 850, 852 (1997)).
17. Id. at 745, 618 S.E.2d at 680 (citing Colonial Oil Indus. v. Underwriters, 268 Ga.
561, 562, 491 S.E.2d 337, 338-39 (1997)).
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of the complaint indicated that the auto exclusion should apply, Canal's
duty to defend was triggered when Bowen told Yeomans that Black was
not acting within the scope of his employment.18
Judge Blackburn's dissent suggests that the decision does not give due
consideration to the intent of the insured and insurer as reflected by the
clear and unambiguous language of the auto exclusion.19 Neither
Bowen nor Canal should have reasonably expected coverage under the
commercial general liability policy because the alleged injury occurred
outside the scope of Black's employment while he was in his personal
automobile.2" Instead, the parties would reasonably expect for coverage
to fall entirely under Black's personal auto liability policy.21
Despite Judge Blackburn's dissent, Yeomans provides a clear warning
to insurers as to how they should proceed in such claims in the future.
An insurer should provide a defense to the insured under a reservation
of rights. As pointed out by the court, this course of action gives the
insurer the opportunity to prove that the insured was not liable under
respondeat superior, thereby satisfying the insurer's "duty to seek that
favorable decision on its insureds' behalf."22 If the jury (or court on
motion for summary judgment) agrees that the driver was not acting
within the scope of his employment, then the insured employer will not
be held liable, and the insurer will have no duty to indemnify and will
have incurred only the cost of defense. If, on the other hand, the jury
determines that the driver was acting within the scope of his employment, then the auto exclusion will apply to prevent any duty to
indemnify the insured for an adverse verdict. The insurer should also
make sure the driver's personal liability carrier is on notice of the claim
because in the event the driver was not acting within the scope of his
employment, the personal auto policy typically will provide primary
coverage.
B.

InsuranceBroker's Liability Limited by Policy Limits
In J. Smith Lanier & Co. v. Southeastern Forge, Inc.,23 the Georgia
Supreme Court held that an insurance broker cannot be held liable for
damages suffered by a client in excess of the policy limits based upon the

18. Id., 618 S.E.2d at 679-80.
19. Id. at 755, 618 S.E.2d at 686 (Blackburn, P.J., dissenting).
20. See id. at 756-57, 618 S.E.2d at 687.
21. See id.
22. Yeomans, 274 Ga. App. at 743, 618 S.E.2d at 678 (citing Penn-Am., 224 Ga. App.
at 558-59, 481 S.E.2d at 851).
23. 280 Ga. 508. 630 S.E.2d 404 (2006).
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broker's breach of contract to obtain insurance coverage.24 Last year,
prior to this holding, the court of appeals in J. Smith Lanier & Co. v.
Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Co.25 held that a broker's liability for
failing to procure coverage for an insured was not limited to the amount
of the policy limits that were the subject of the failure to procure a
coverage claim.26 In Southeastern Forge, the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed that ruling.27 Southeastern Forge, Inc. ("Southeastern") was
a client of J. Smith Lanier ("Lanier"), an independent insurance broker
who agreed to procure commercial general liability insurance for
Southeastern. When applying for the insurance, Lanier failed to list a
prior loss involving Southeastern. After the policy was issued, a
Southeastern product caused serious injuries that resulted in a lawsuit
and subsequent settlement well in excess of the policy limits. Meanwhile, the insurer learned of the prior loss and obtained a judgment that
its policy was void ab initio, leaving Southeastern without adequate
insurance coverage and facing a large uninsured loss. Southeastern
sued Lanier, seeking the total amount of its uninsured loss.28

The supreme court noted, "Under Georgia law, the potential liability
of an insurance broker is limited to the terms of the insurance policy it
negligently failed to procure. '29 Therefore, if Lanier were to be found
to have breached its agreement to obtain insurance coverage, Southeastern could not recover any more than the liability limits of the policy
Lanier had agreed to procure.30 The supreme court held that the court
of appeals had erroneously equated the measure of damages for the
broker to that of an insurer who is liable for damages in excess of policy
limits for its bad faith refusal to settle a claim.3 1
It is important to note that there was no dispute that the broker was
solely the insured's agent and not a dual agent for the purposes of
obtaining insurance. If the broker or agent had authority to bind
insurance on behalf of the insurer, the outcome may have been different.
If such an agent has knowledge of a prior loss or some other material
fact, that knowledge may affect whether the application for insurance
would be accepted or whether the policy would have been issued in a
different form or at a different premium. In that situation, a question

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 508, 630 S.E.2d at 405.
272 Ga. App. 789, 612 S.E.2d 843 (2005).
Id. at 797-98, 612 S.E.2d at 851.
280 Ga. at 508, 630 S.E.2d at 405.
Id. at 508-09, 630 S.E.2d at 405-06.
Id. at 509, 630 S.E.2d at 406.
Id. at 510-11, 630 S.E.2d at 407.
Id. at 510, 630 S.E.2d at 407.
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of fact will exist as to whether the insurer is deemed to have constructive knowledge of that material fact. If the insurer has constructive
knowledge of that material fact, it is prohibited from voiding the policy
ab initio,32 and the insurer's recourse is a suit against the agent for its
failure to notify the insurer of the material fact.
C. "ArisingOut Of" Language Interpreted Broadly in Determining
Additional Insured Coverage
In Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications,
Inc., the Georgia Court of Appeals demonstrated how broadly it will
interpret the phrase "arising out of operations" in determining whether
a person or entity qualifies as an additional insured under a commercial
general liability policy.34 A Ryder employee was injured while working
at a Bellsouth facility pursuant to a contract between Ryder and
Bellsouth. The claimant sued Bellsouth, alleging that the employee was
injured as a result of Bellsouth's sole negligence in failing to maintain
the premises. Bellsouth did not dispute that the claim was based upon
its sole negligence nor did Bellsouth contend that Ryder did anything to
contribute to the alleged injuries. Bellsouth tendered a defense to Ryder
and Ryder's commercial general liability carrier, Republic. The contract
between the parties required Ryder to obtain commercial general
liability coverage in which Bellsouth would be named as an additional
insured with respect to work performed under the agreement. Republic's
commercial general liability policy contained an additional insured
endorsement that named as an insured any organization for which Ryder
was obligated by written agreement to provide liability insurance, "'but
35
...only with respect to liability arising out of [Ryder's] operations.'
Ryder and Republic argued that no liability arose out of Ryder's
operations because (1) the complaint alleged that Bellsouth was solely
negligent in maintaining the premises and (2) maintenance of the
premises was not part of Ryder's operations. Ryder and Republic
concluded by arguing that Bellsouth should not be afforded additional
It held that
insured coverage for the claim.3" The court disagreed.
"arising out of your operations" meant arising out of a "business
transaction" or work performed by Ryder, regardless of whether Ryder's

32.
S.E.2d
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See, e.g., Jarriel v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 136, 138-39, 270
238, 241 (1980).
277 Ga. App. 679, 627 S.E.2d 358 (2006), cert. granted.
Id. at 685, 627 S.E.2d at 364.
Id. at 684, 627 S.E.2d at 363 (omission in original).
Id.
Id.
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work or the business transaction itself was responsible for the injuries.3" Because the claimant was a Ryder employee performing work
at the Bellsouth facility pursuant to Ryder's "business transaction"-that
is, pursuant to the contract with Bellsouth-Bellsouth qualified as an
additional insured under the policy.39 The court adopted the majority
rule from other jurisdictions, which has been articulated as "where as
here, the insurer grants coverage for liability 'arising out of' the named
insured's work, the additional insured is covered without regard to
whether the injury was attributable to the named insured or the
additional insured." ° In particular, the court cited with approval a
California case which concluded that "'[t]he fact that the defect [that
caused the injury] was attributable to [the additional insured's]
negligence is irrelevant, since the policy
language does not purport to
41
allocate coverage according to fault.'"
This case shows how broadly the court of appeals will interpret
"arising out of operations" to find additional insured coverage. While
Georgia courts have historically interpreted "arising out of" language in
an insurance policy broadly, they have also held that the phrase requires
a causal nexus between the wrongful conduct and the injury alleged.
In Carver v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,4 the court noted, "In
reviewing an insurance policy, [the Georgia] Supreme Court has
interpreted an event 'arising out of' a person's action to constitute an
event that would not have occurred but for the person's action."" In
fact, during the same timeframe addressed by this survey, the court of
appeals again applied the "but for" analysis in interpreting the phrase
"arose out of" in the context of a professional liability insurance policy

38. Id. at 684-85, 627 S.E.2d at 363-64.
39. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 363.
40. Id. at 685, 627 S.E.2d at 364.
41. Id. (quoting Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Syufy Enters., 69 Cal. App. 4th 321, 328-29
(1999)) (alterations in original). For a good overview of cases throughout the country that
have held that similar language provides coverage to an additional insured for its own
negligence, see McIntosh v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., 992 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1993). See
also Merchants Ins. Co. of N.H. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 143 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1998)
(finding a general contractor covered as an additional insured with regard to injury
suffered by subcontractor employee because the injury "arose out ofr subcontractor's
operations, even though injury was due to the general contractor's negligence); Cincinnati
Ins. Co. v. Dawes Rigging & Crane Rental, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 975 (C.D. Ill. 2004).
42. See, e.g., Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Dunn, 269 Ga. 213, 496 S.E.2d 696 (1998);
Cont'l Cas. Co. v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 266 Ga. 260, 466 S.E.2d 4 (1996); Carver v. Empire
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 270 Ga. App. 100, 605 S.E.2d 842 (2004); Pilz v. Monticello Ins. Co.,
267 Ga. App. 370, 599 S.E.2d 220 (2004).
43. 270 Ga. App. 100, 605 S.E.2d 842 (2004).
44. Id. at 102-03, 605 S.E.2d at 844-45.
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in Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. v. OHIC Insurance Co.45
However, the court in Ryder has arguably removed the requirement of
a causal connection between the named insured's product, conduct, or
business transaction and the injury, and replaced it with the requirement that there be any connection. The fact that the injured person was
a Ryder employee and the fact that a contract existed between Bellsouth
and Ryder was sufficient for the court to find a connection, even though
Ryder's operations had no causal connection to the alleged injury.46 If
that is indeed what the court intended by its holding, it may lead to
coverage for an additional insured in situations where neither the
insurer nor the named insured ever intended there to be additional
insured coverage. For example, if a named insured distributor entered
into a contract with a retailer to supply merchandise to the retailer's
store, and merchandise supplied by the named insured to the retailer fell
on a customer's head as a direct result of how the retailer stacked it on
a shelf, the retailer may rely on Ryder to argue that the contract with
the distributor was a sufficient connection to qualify the retailer as an
additional insured. Because the supreme court has granted certiorari, 4
the reader can anticipate that its ruling will be addressed in next year's
survey article.
D.

Timeliness of Notice to Insurer after Default Judgment Entered

In last year's annual survey,48 we discussed the court of appeals
49
decision in Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v.Karan, Inc. ("Karan 1'),
which dealt with the breach of a timely notice condition in a commercial
general liability policy. The decision stood for the proposition that an
insured has breached the timely notice condition in a commercial general
liability policy, as a matter of law, when (1) a default judgment against
the insured is entered before the insured provides notice of the suit to
the insurer and (2) there remains no question of fact that the insured
had no viable excuse.5" During this year's annual survey period, the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed that decision in Karan, Inc. v. AutoOwners Insurance Co. ("Karan Ir").51

45. 275 Ga. App. 55, 60, 619 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2005).
46. Ryder, 277 Ga. App. at 684-85, 627 S.E.2d at 363.
47. Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., No. S06G1133, 2006
Ga. LEXIS 493, at *1 (July 14, 2006).
48. Stephen M. Schatz, Bradley S. Wolff & Stephen L. Cotter, Insurance, 57 MERCER
L. REv. 221, 226-28 (2005).
49. 272 Ga. App. 620, 612 S.E.2d 920 (2005).
50. Id. at 622-23, 612 S.E.2d at 922.
51. 280 Ga. 545, 548, 629 S.E.2d 260, 264 (2006).
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In Karan 11, the insured failed to notify its liability insurer of the
lawsuit brought against it until after a default judgment had already
been entered in the case. The policy required the insured to notify its
carrier of a lawsuit "as soon as practicable. "5 2 In response to the
default judgment, the insured filed a motion to open the default on the
grounds of insufficiency of service, but the state court denied the
motion.53 The court of appeals held that by denying the motion to open
default, the state court determined that the insured failed to prove
improper service of the complaint, which, consequently, collaterally
estopped the insured from arguing that service was not proper as a valid
excuse for failing to provide timely notice. Because the insured was left
without any viable excuse for not notifying the insurer before default
judgment was entered, the insured's notice was untimely as a matter of
law."4 When the case came before the Georgia Supreme Court, the
court held that "the [Georgia] Court of Appeals had misapplied the
principles of resjudicata and collateral estoppel to preclude inquiry into
the issue of whether the insured provided timely notice.""5
The
supreme court explained, "The issue sought to be precluded must
actually have been litigated and decided in the first action before
collateral estoppel would bar it from being considered in the second
action, or the issue necessarily had to be decided in orderfor the previous
56
judgment to have been rendered."
Because the issue of whether notice
was timely was not decided by the entry of the default, and because the
issue of timely notice did not necessarily have to be decided in order to
enter the default, a question of fact still remained whether the insured
had a viable excuse for not providing the insurer with notice until after
default judgment was entered.57
E.

Extent of Insured's Duty to Provide Notice

In FederatedMutual Insurance Co. v. Ownbey Enterprises,Inc., 8 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that because the language of an insurance
policy was ambiguous, the insured had no affirmative duty to make sure
that its commercial general liability insurer actually received the notice
of a lawsuit that the insured provided to its agent.59 After a lawsuit

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 545, 629 S.E.2d at 262.
Id.
Karan 1, 272 Ga. App. at 623, 612 S.E.2d at 922.
Karan H, 280 Ga. at 545, 629 S.E.2d at 262.
Id. at 547, 629 S.E.2d at 263.
Id.
278 Ga. App. 1, 627 S.E.2d 917 (2006), cert. denied.
Id. at 6, 627 S.E.2d at 921.
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was served upon the insured corporation, the corporation mailed a copy
of the suit to its agent at the address shown on the agent's business
card. Both the agent and insurer denied receiving the notice. No
answer was filed, and a default judgment was awarded. The commercial
general liability policy contained a notice condition that stated if a claim
is made or suit is brought, the insured "must see to it that ... [the
insurer] receive[s] written notice of the claim or 'suit' as soon as
practicable.""0 In reliance on the "must see to it" language, the insurer
contended that the insured was obligated to follow up with the insurer
to confirm that suit papers were in fact received. 6
The court disagreed, holding that the phrase was ambiguous because it is subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation. 2 The court reasoned that on
the one hand, the phrase may be read to require the insured to "see to
it" that the insurer received the written notice, but on the other hand,
it can be read to require the insured to "see to it" that the notice of the
suit is in writing.63 The court concluded that because of the ambiguity,
the language must be read to require that the insured "see to it" that the
notice is in writing. 4 This decision follows the court's trend to enforce
the notice condition as clearly and unambiguously written, and to reject
attempts to interpret the language to place a greater duty upon the
insured than the policy intended. The fact that the court found no other
case in the country in which an insurer presented this rather unique
argument likely influenced its decision. 5

III.
A.

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW

AppraisalProvisions

In McGowan v. Progressive PreferredInsurance Co. ,6 a divided court
of appeals upheld the enforceability of the appraisal provisions
commonly found in Georgia automobile insurance policies.6 7 The court
further held that the insurers' payment of the full appraised value of the

60. Id. at 4, 627 S.E.2d at 920. This policy language is common in commercial general
liability policies and is found in CGL cover forms written by Insurance Services Offices,
Inc. ("ISO").
61. Id.
62. Id. at 6, 627 S.E.2d at 921 (citing Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meyers, 249
Ga. App. 322, 324, 548 S.E.2d 67, 69 (2001)).
63. Id.
64. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 922.
65. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 921.
66. 274 Ga. App. 483, 618 S.E.2d 139 (2005).
67. Id. at 486, 618 S.E.2d at 143.
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insureds' automobiles mooted the insureds' claims for fraud, breach of
contract, and RICO violations. 8 Three cases were brought by different
insureds against their respective automobile insurers after each
insured's vehicle was rendered a total loss and after each insurer paid
(or offered) compensation for the property loss. Each lawsuit named
CCC Information Services as a defendant, based upon the plaintiffs'
allegation that each insurer based its property valuation upon inaccurate
figures provided by CCC and that the insurers and CCC conspired to
deliberately undervalue their property losses. Each suit was filed as a
purported class action.69
During the litigation, the trial court ordered an appraisal of the
plaintiffs' vehicles in accordance with the appraisal provision of each
insurer's policy. The appraisals were done and in each instance resulted
in a valuation higher than originally determined by the insurer. The
insurers paid the difference in the amount of loss. The trial court then
held that all claims raised by plaintiffs had been mooted by payment of
the appraised valuation of the vehicles because all claims made in the
complaints arose out of the dispute over valuation."
On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court had erroneously
enforced the appraisals and allowed them to be determinative because
enforcing the provisions converted them into arbitration provisions in
violation of Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 9-92(c)(3),71 which prohibits the enforcement of arbitration provisions in
insurance policies."
The court of appeals rejected this argument,
holding that an appraisal is not equivalent to arbitration, primarily
because an appraisal is a determination of the amount of a loss pursuant
to a contractual agreement as to the method for resolution and is not the
equivalent of an award, which could encompass questions of law and a
determination of liability.73 The court of appeals further affirmed the
trial court's holding that fulfillment of the appraisal clause mooted all
other claims that arose out of the allegedly improper valuations, despite
the fact that the insureds had to file suit in order to recover the full
amount of their losses.74

68. Id. at 494, 618 S.E.2d at 148-49.
69. Id. at 483, 618 S.E.2d at 141.
70. Id. at 485, 618 S.E.2d at 143 (citing Eberhardt v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
223 Ga. App. 478, 477 S.E.2d 907 (1996)); see also S. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Kent, 187 Ga. App.
496, 370 S.E.2d 663 (1998).
71. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (Supp. 2006).
72. McGowan, 274 Ga. App. at 486, 618 S.E.2d at 143.
73. Id. at 486-87, 618 S.E.2d at 143-44.
74. Id. at 491-94, 618 S.E.2d at 146-49.
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The dissent, authored by Judge Barnes and joined by Judges Ellington
and Bernes, took issue with the majority's holding that the claims
related to the insurers' alleged conspiracy and bad faith in the claims
resolution process could not survive the payment of the full amount of
the property loss.75 As succinctly stated by Judge Barnes:
An insured whose insurer systematically and fraudulently undervalues
insured vehicles, only paying fair market value when the insured
invokes a contractual appraisal clause, states a claim for relief that
should not be dismissed on the insurer's motion. If it could be so
dismissed, then an insurance company could consistently undervalue
all of its claims, only pay full value to those insureds who have the
time and resources to persevere through an additional procedural level,
and never have to account to its underpaid customers.76
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 13,
2006."7 In its order, the supreme court identified those issues raised
by the dissent as the issues that "particularly concerned" the court:
"Whether the [Georgia] Court of Appeals correctly held that invocation
of the appraisal clause in the insurance policies in this case mooted
claims of fraud, breach of contract, and RICO asserted against the
insurers."78 Oral arguments were heard in October 2006.
B.

What Is "Use" of a Vehicle?

The standard automobile insurance policy includes within the
definition of "insured" any person "using" a covered vehicle. Whether
a passenger who is merely riding in a covered vehicle at the time it is
involved in a collision is "using" the vehicle became a question of first
impression for the Georgia courts in Padgett v.Georgia Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co.79
Padgett was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by a co-worker,
Walker, and owned by Walker's father, their mutual employer. A
collision occurred while Walker and Padgett were returning to a job site
after running errands. The driver of the other vehicle, Caravella, sued
Walker, Walker's father, and Padgett for injuries sustained in the
collision. The claim against Padgett alleged that Padgett negligently
entrusted the vehicle to Walker. °

75. Id. at 495, 618 S.E.2d at 149 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. McGowan v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., No. S05G2086, 2006 Ga, LEXIS 124,
at *1 (Feb. 13, 2006).
78. Id.
79. 276 Ga. App. 796, 797, 625 S.E.2d 76, 77 (2005).
80. Id. at 796, 625 S.E.2d at 76-77.
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Padgett sought a defense from Georgia Farm, which insured the
Walker vehicle. Georgia Farm brought a declaratory judgment action,
seeking a determination that Padgett was not an insured under the
policy. The trial court agreed with Georgia Farm and granted it
summary judgment."'
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the term "using," which
was not defined in the policy, is ambiguous and thus must be construed
against Georgia Farm."2 The ambiguity, according to the court, lies in
the fact that "using" could be understood to mean "operating," but it
could also mean "employing a vehicle for transportation." 3 In fact, the
court noted that the majority of other jurisdictions that have decided this
question have held that a vehicle is being "used" by one who is traveling
in it, even if that person is not operating the vehicle. 4 Because
Georgia Farm drafted the insurance policy, the court construed the
ambiguity in favor of Padgett and reversed the trial court's summary
judgment."5
IV.

A.

UNINSURED MOTORIST CASES

Prorationof Policy Limits

A recurrent issue in uninsured motorist ("UM") cases is the question
of priority among stackable policy limits. Application of the rules
continues to confuse trial courts, and as illustrated below, new situations
call for new rules.
1. Proration Not Allowed Under Georgia Law. In Continental
Insurance Co. v. Southern Guaranty Insurance Co.,86 a trial court once
again failed to adhere to the unambiguous Georgia rule that UM
insurance coverage is never prorated between carriers.8 7 Instead, the
law requires that one UM carrier must be primary and the other or
others must be attributed with lower priority in a series.88 In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Bayside Insurance Co.,89 the

81. Id., 625 S.E.2d at 76.
82. Id. at 797-98, 625 S.E.2d at 77-78.
83. Id. at 798, 625 S.E.2d at 78.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 193 Ga. App. 395, 388 S.E.2d 16 (1989).
87. Id. at 396, 388 S.E.2d at 18.
88. Id. at 395-96, 388 S.E.2d at 17 (citing Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 166, 167, 336 S.E.2d 237, 238 (1985)); see also Great Divide
Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 260 Ga. App. 531, 532, 580 S.E.2d 313, 314 (2003).
89. 278 Ga. App. 73, 628 S.E.2d 177 (2006).

2006]

INSURANCE

insured maintained UM policies with two different companies covering
three different vehicles. The Progressive policy insured a motorcycle,
which was the vehicle involved in the collision underlying the case.
Nationwide's policy insured two automobiles. When the insured made
a claim against both insurers seeking compensation for injuries he
sustained in a collision, Nationwide filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment against the insured and Progressive. Both insurers agreed
that their coverage applied to the collision, but they disagreed as to how
the coverage should be prioritized. Progressive argued that the coverage
from each policy should be added together and prorated according to the
ratio of policy limits to the total UM coverage available. The trial court
agreed with Progressive and granted it summary judgment, declaring a
proration between the two insurance companies.9"
The court of appeals reversed."1 After stating that proration of
coverage between UM carriers was inappropriate,9 2 the court recited
the two tests which are most commonly used to determine priority
among carriers: (1) the "receipt of premium" test and (2) the "more
closely identified with" test.93 Neither test was determinative in this
case, however, because the injured party was the named insured and the
payor of premiums for both policies.94 The court therefore looked to the
circumstances of the collision, and because the insured was injured while
operating his motorcycle insured by Progressive but not Nationwide, the
court held that Progressive was the primary carrier.95
2. Proration Allowed Under Foreign Law. According to McGow
v. McCurry,9 6 when a UM policy is issued to an insured residing in
another state, and the insured is involved in a collision with an
uninsured motorist in Georgia, the provisions of the UM policy may be
enforced according to the laws of the state in which it was issued, even
if the provisions of the policy would not be enforceable under Georgia
law.97 In McGow the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied
Michigan law to determine the liability of three UM carriers for damages
sustained by their insured-a resident of Michigan-injured in a
collision in Georgia." The Michigan policy included clauses that were

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 73-74, 628 S.E.2d at 178-79.
Id. at 76, 628 S.E.2d at 180.
Id. at 74, 628 S.E.2d at 179.
Id. at 74-75, 628 S.E.2d at 179.
Id. at 75, 628 S.E.2d at 179-80.
Id.
412 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2005).
See id. at 1223.
Id. at 1218-22.
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foreign to Georgia, including provisions that allowed one of the policies
to escape liability entirely.9 9 Although the applicable provisions of the
Michigan policies demanded a result that could not be obtained in
Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit held that because application of Michigan
law would only determine which insurance company pays the insured
and not act to deprive the insured of compensation for his injuries,
Georgia public policy was not implicated by application of Michigan
law.1"' Thus, in accordance with the provisions of the policies and
Michigan law, the Eleventh Circuit determined that one of the insurers
was entitled to judgment in its favor without liability and the other two
insurers would be liable for the insured's damages on a pro rata basis in
proportion to their coverage limits. 10 1
B.

Notice

Three noteworthy cases addressing the issue of notice occurred during
the survey period. In two of these cases, the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that an insured's failure to notify an insurer as required by the
policy allowed the insurers to escape liability. In the third case, the
insured's failure to notify the police of the collision barred an uninsured
motorist claim.
1. Failure to Notify Insurer of the Accident. In Royer v.
Murphy, 10 2 the insurance policy at issue provided that "'any person
claiming coverage under this policy ... must notify us as soon as
practicable"' by calling the claims office or a claims hotline. 10 3 The
policy further provided that the insurer could not be sued "'unless there
is full compliance with all terms of [the] policy.""0 4 Nevertheless, the
insured failed to notify the insurer, which insured two vehicles owned by
her husband and not the vehicle involved in the collision, until suit was
filed two years after the accident. The UM carrier moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the insured had not given it timely notice
of the accident, and the trial court granted the motion. 0 5 The court
of appeals agreed, holding that the insured's failure to notify the insurer
of the accident for almost two years amounted to an unreasonable delay
as a matter of law, and because the notice requirement was a condition

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1221-22.
Id. at 1223.
277 Ga. App. 150, 625 S.E.2d 544 (2006).
Id. at 150-51, 625 S.E.2d at 545 (omission in original).
Id. at 151, 625 S.E.2d at 545 (brackets in original).
Id.
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precedent to the assertion of any claim under the 10policy,
the insured's
6
failure to notify the carrier was fatal to her claim.
2. Failure to Notify the Insurer of Legal Action. In Burkett v.
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,107 the insured failed to provide
proper notice in two respects. First, the insured failed to promptly notify
the carrier of the underlying collision. Second, it failed to notify the
carrier of a declaratory judgment action brought by another carrier
concerning its duty to provide coverage to a driver involved in the
underlying collision. ' Two UM policies applied to the collision. Both
of the UM carriers' policies required any person seeking UM coverage to
notify the carrier of a legal action brought in connection with the
accident and to "promptly" send the carrier copies of suit papers if any
action was brought in connection with the accident.109 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the UM carriers. 10° Because the
insured failed to notify the two UM carriers of the declaratory judgment
action (in which a potential liability carrier was granted summary
judgment and thus UM coverage was implicated), and the notice
provisions were conditions precedent to coverage, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the UM
carriers."'
3. Failure to Notify Police of Hit and Run. Finally, in Penderv.
Doe," 2' the insured was injured in a collision with a hit-and-run driver.
The insured went to the hospital, had surgery, and was hospitalized for
several days. The collision was not reported to the police for twenty-nine
days. When the insured brought an action against his UM carrier, the
insurer moved for summary judgment, asserting that the failure to
report the collision to police immediately, as required by O.C.G.A. section
40-6-273," 3 barred the insured's claim." 4 The trial court granted
summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed." 5 The court

106. Id.
107. 278 Ga. App. 681, 629 S.E.2d 558 (2006).
108. Id. at 682-84, 629 S.E.2d at 559-60.
109. Id. at 683, 629 S.E.2d at 560.
110. Id. at 682, 629 S.E.2d at 559.
111. Id. at 683-84, 629 S.E.2d at 560-61.
112. 276 Ga. App. 178, 622 S.E.2d 888 (2005).
113. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-273 (2004). "The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in injury ... shall immediately, by the quickest means of communication, give
notice of such accident to the local police department . . . ." Id.
114. Pender, 276 Ga. App. at 178, 622 S.E.2d at 889.
115. Id.
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relied upon its decision in Navarro v. Atlanta Casualty Co.,116 in which
it held that the statutory requirement of immediate notice to the police
"cannot be stretched to include four or five days later" and that this
notice requirement "is not a matter of abatement, but a condition
precedent to recovery under uninsured motorist coverage."117
C. Can I Choose My Coverage Limits Now?
During the survey period, two cases were decided by the court of
appeals that involved insureds claiming they were entitled to retroactively increase their policies' UM limits due to a 2001 amendment to the
UM statute.
Prior to the 2001 amendment, O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(a)(1)(B)" 8
provided that an insured must either reject UM coverage or opt for UM
limits in an amount "not greater than" the liability limits of the
policy. 119 Otherwise, all policies of automobile insurance by default
would include UM coverage equal to the minimum liability limits of
$15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident for bodily injury or
death. 2 ° When the minimum liability limits were increased in 2000,
O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11(a)(1)(A) was similarly amended to raise the
amounts of minimum UM coverage to $25,000 per person and $50,000

per accident. 121

In 2001 the UM statute was amended again. 12 2 The 2001 amendment changed the default scheme so that unless a different election was
affirmatively made by the insured, all policies would provide UM
of the
coverage in an amount "equal to" the liability coverage 2limits
3
amounts.
minimum
mandatory
the
only
of
instead
policy,
In Tice v. American Employers Insurance Co.,12 41 Mr. and Mrs. Tice
were insured by two policies issued prior to the 2000 amendment. Each
policy provided UM coverage in the statutory minimum amount but
liability coverage of $50,000 per person. When the policies renewed after
the 2000 amendment, the UM coverage was increased in each policy to
$25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. No change was made to
the policies following the 2001 amendment. In 2003 Mrs. Tice was

116. 250 Ga. App. 550, 552 S.E.2d 508 (2001).
117. Id. at 551, 522 S.E.2d at 509.
118. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1)(B) (2000).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 2000 Ga. Laws 1516.
122. 2001 Ga. Laws 1228.
123. Id. The current version of the statute is codified at O.C.G.A. section 33-711(a)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
124. 275 Ga. App. 125, 619 S.E.2d 797 (2005).
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injured in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. The Tices
filed a tort suit for damages arising from the collision and obtained a
$100,000 consent judgment. The Tices then brought a declaratory
judgment action against their insurer, claiming that they were entitled
to stack the UM coverage of $50,000 from each of the two policies for a
cumulative total of $100,000 for the accident. The Tices argued that
because of the 2001 amendment and their insurer's failure to obtain an
election from the insureds for UM coverage less than the default amount
(equal to the liability coverage), they were entitled to the new default
amounts. The insurer, to the contrary, argued that although the Tices
were entitled to stack the coverage from the two policies, they were only
entitled to $25,000 per policy for a cumulative total of $50,000.125
The court of appeals agreed with the insurer.126 After reviewing the
history of the UM statute concerning coverage limits from 1963 through
2001, the court held that "[nlothing in the 2001 amendment required the
insurer to notify policyholders who had chosen the statutory minimum
amounts of UM coverage that optional UM coverage now must be equal
to the liability limits of the underlying policy."127 Thus, the court
determined that although new policies issued after the 2001 amendment
would default to UM limits equal to the liability limits, renewal policies
that had minimum limits prior to 2001 would continue to renew with
minimum limits unless the insured affirmatively changed the policy
coverage.28
A similar issue was presented to the court of appeals in McKinnon v.
Progressive Bayside Insurance Co.'29 In that case, the insured's policy
was originally issued with $25,000/$50,000 liability limits and $15,000/
$30,000 UM limits. The policy was renewed in 2001 with UM insurance
limits increased to $25,000/$50,000. In 2002 the policy was again
renewed with liability limits increased to $50,000/$100,000 and the UM
limits remaining at $25,000/$50,000. These same limits were used when
the policy was renewed in 2003. The insured was involved in a collision
in 2003. The insured brought a lawsuit for damages arising from the
collision and served her UM carrier. The insurer moved for summary
judgment to establish the limits of its coverage. The insured argued that
because there was no evidence that she had made any election as to the
amount of her UM coverage-whether to reject UM coverage, choose
minimum limits, or to choose limits in any amount greater than the

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 125, 619 S.E.2d at 798.
Id. at 127-28, 619 S.E.2d at 800.
Id. at 128, 619 S.E.2d at 800.
Id. at 127-28, 619 S.E.2d at 800.
278 Ga. App. 429, 629 S.E.2d 100 (2006).
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minimum-the insurer should be required to provide coverage in an
amount equal to the liability limits.3 ° The court of appeals, relying
primarily on Tice, disagreed.' 3' Although in Tice the insured had
elected minimum UM coverage when the policies were originally
issued,'32 the court held that this distinction did not make a difference
because McKinnon's failure to elect UM coverage for an amount greater
than the minimum resulted in a default selection of minimum limits."'3 The insurer had no obligation to change these limits after the
statute was amended in 2001 or to notify the insured of the opportunity
to elect coverage in a different amount.'
D.

Importance of a Judgment Against the Tortfeasor

A series of cases decided during the survey period illustrate the
necessity for a judgment against the tortfeasor in order to collect from
a UM carrier.
In Laviano v. Travelers Insurance Co.,"' the insured brought a suit
against an uninsured motorist and two UM carriers. A discovery dispute
with Travelers resulted in the carrier being held in contempt. The trial
court then struck Travelers's answer and held it in default. The
uninsured motorist was also defaulted as a sanction for failure to
respond to discovery. Because the remaining UM carrier was not in
default, a jury trial was held and the jury found the uninsured motorist
and remaining UM carrier not liable for the insured's injuries.""
The insured filed a motion for a damages hearing against Travelers-the defaulted UM carrier-in order to liquidate the damages
sustained in the accident. Following the jury's verdict of no liability in
favor of the remaining defendants, the trial court denied the insured's
request for a hearing on damages. The insured then appealed, claiming
that because the UM carrier was defaulted, its liability had been
determined and the only remaining issue was that of damages." 7 The
court of appeals disagreed."' Following Brown v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. ,"' the court held that the insured had failed

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 429-30, 629 S.E.2d at 101.
Id. at 431-32, 629 S.E.2d at 102.
Tice, 275 Ga. App. at 125, 619 S.E.2d at 798.
McKinnon, 278 Ga. App. at 431, 629 S.E.2d at 102.
Id. at 431-32, 629 S.E.2d at 102.
276 Ga. App. 611, 624 S.E.2d 189 (2005).
Id. at 611-12, 624 S.E.2d at 189-90.
Id. at 612, 624 S.E.2d at 190.
Id. at 612-14, 624 S.E.2d at 190-91.
242 Ga. App. 313, 315, 529 S.E.2d 439, 441-42 (2000).
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to establish his entitlement to coverage under the policy because he was
140
not legally entitled to recover damages from the uninsured motorist.
The court also indicated by its use of an extended quotation without
explanatory analysis that the insured may have waived a right to a
damages hearing against the defaulted UM carrier by proceeding to trial
on the merits against the defaulted uninsured motorist and remaining
UM carrier.14 A petition for writ of certiorari was denied on April 25,
2006.142
In Cohen v. Allstate Insurance Co., 14 two plaintiffs brought a
lawsuit against a known defendant and Allstate as the plaintiffs' UM
carrier. The plaintiffs had difficulty locating the tortfeasor and failed to
serve him until almost two years after the lawsuit was initially filed and
more than a year after the expiration of the statute of limitations. In
the meantime, the plaintiffs had obtained an order for publication
service and effected publication.'
After the tortfeasor was served, he and Allstate brought a motion for
summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs failed to exercise the
necessary degree of diligence in locating and serving the defendant, and
therefore the claims against him were barred by the statute of limitations. The UM carrier further argued that because the claims against
the tortfeasor were due to be dismissed and the plaintiffs could not
recover a judgment against the uninsured motorist, the carrier was also
entitled to45 summary judgment in its favor. The trial court granted both
motions. 1
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that when the trial court
dismissed the claims against the tortfeasor on the merits, no judgment
could be obtained against him "[a]nd such a judgment is required in
order to obtain a judgment against the plaintiffs' uninsured motorist
carrier."14' The court of appeals also noted that although a judgment
against the uninsured motorist could be a nominal judgment only, based
upon publication service, a judgment against the uninsured motorist,
even a nominal judgment, was still a condition precedent to recovery
against the UM carrier.'47
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Laviano, 276 Ga. App. at 613, 624 S.E.2d at 190-91.
Id., 624 S.E.2d at 191.
No. S06C0697, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 333, at *1 (Apr. 25, 2006).
277 Ga. App. 437, 626 S.E.2d 628 (2006).
Id. at 437-38, 626 S.E.2d at 629-30.
Id. at 437, 626 S.E.2d at 629.
Id. at 440, 626 S.E.2d at 631-32.
Id. at 440-41, 626 S.E.2d at 632.
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The case of Patel v. Sanders'4 involved similar underlying facts but
resulted in a different outcome. The plaintiffs were unable to locate and
serve the known owner and operator of the tortfeasor vehicle and
obtained an order for service by publication. The named defendants
learned of the lawsuit and filed an answer, claiming that they had not
been served and that the statute of limitations had expired. These
defendants then filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,
which the trial court originally granted. The plaintiffs moved for
reconsideration of that order, arguing that although the individual
defendants were entitled to be dismissed and no in personam judgment
could be rendered against them, the case could and should continue
against the UM carrier, State Farm, based upon the publication service.
The trial court agreed and entered an order dismissing the claims
against the named defendants but allowing the claims to proceed against
State Farm. 1 49 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the named
defendants were entitled to be dismissed but that based upon the
publication service, the claims against the UM carrier could proceed and
a judgment entered would be enforceable against the carrier.' 50
The importance of the procedural issues involved in Cohen and Patel
are highlighted by a case recently decided by the court of appeals just
outside the survey period, but which should be noted due to its
importance to practitioners in this field. Butler v. Gary, Williams,
Parenti,Finney, Lewis, McManus, Watson & Sperardo P.L."5' is a legal
malpractice case brought against the law firm that represented the
plaintiffs in a car crash case. As in Cohen and Patel, attempts at
personal service on the tortfeasor were unsuccessful and the plaintiffs
effected publication service. State Farm, the plaintiffs' UM carrier, was
served. The tortfeasor was finally located and served nearly three years
after the statute of limitations expired. The tortfeasor then brought a
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment based
upon the belated service. The tortfeasor-defendant's motion was
granted, terminating the litigation as in the Cohen case. The plaintiffs
then brought an action against the lawyers, supported by an affidavit,
which identified the failure to obtain a nominal judgment against the
tortfeasor based upon the publication service as an act of malpractice
because the lawyers failed to preserve a claim against the UM carrier.152 The trial court granted the attorneys' motion for summary
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277 Ga. App. 152, 626 S.E.2d 145 (2006).
Id. at 152-53, 626 S.E.2d at 147.
Id. at 154, 626 S.E.2d at 148.
280 Ga. App. 207, 633 S.E.2d 614 (2006).
Id. at 207, 633 S.E.2d at 616.
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judgment, but the court of appeals reversed. 5 3 The court of appeals
held that summary judgment was improper because the attorneys may
have breached the standard of care and proximately caused the
plaintiffs' inability to recover for their injuries.'5 4 The attorneys might
have breached the standard of care by (1) failing to dismiss the lawsuit
after service upon the tortfeasor and refiling it pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 9-2-61... or by (2) failing to proceed against the UM carrier
based upon the publication service.5 6 Because this has proven to be
a recurring fact pattern in the last year, practitioners should be aware
of the risks and alternatives when known tortfeasors are difficult to
locate but are found while the UM case remains pending.
V.

HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE

An interesting trio of opinions used policy considerations-the
collateral source doctrine, the federal doctrine of judicial estoppel, and
the duty to disclose financial details where fraud is suspected-to
regulate the flow of insurance proceeds, or lack thereof.
In Rabun & Associates Construction, Inc. v. Berry,'5 7 homeowners
Berry and Squillante were able to successfully raise the collateral source
rule (1) to retain the $503,254.83 they received from Fireman's Fund,
their homeowner's carrier, for a loss to their home caused by rainwater
and (2) to recover for the same loss against the general contractor,
Rabun, and others who allowed rainwater to damage the home. 55
Judge Bernes carefully evaluated alternative defenses by which the
general contractor attempted to stave off a large property loss that it
claimed the parties had contractually agreed would be borne by the
homeowners' carrier.'59
While the court recognized the "mutual
exculpation rule" originally established in Georgia in Tuxedo Plumbing
& Heating Co. v. Lie-Nielsen,6 ° the construction contract term in this
case required the homeowners to "have fire, theft and liability insurance
coverage."'
The clause did not include the peril (rainwater) involved
in this case. 162 Practitioners may wish to review such standard
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Id. at 210, 633 S.E.2d at 618.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (1982 & Supp. 2006).
Butler, 280 Ga. App. at 210-11, 633 S.E.2d at 618.
276 Ga. App. 485, 623 S.E.2d 691 (2005).
Id. at 486, 490, 623 S.E.2d at 693, 696.
Id. at 486-90, 623 S.E.2d at 694-96.
245 Ga. 27, 28, 262 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1980).
Rabun, 276 Ga. App. at 487, 623 S.E.2d at 694.
Id.
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"insurance" clauses in contracts to assure the parties' full intent is clear.
The court held that intent was clear and the parties intended to shift the
risk of loss for the perils of fire, theft and general liability, but not
rainwater damage. 6 3 The court expressly recognized that a different
decision would result from a loss caused by fire or theft."
The court also rejected the general contractor's attempts to benefit
from the insurance, a collateral source.165 The court rejected the
argument that proof of loss language subrogating the homeowners'
carrier "to the property for which the claim is being made" could be
extended to include subrogation to "the claim or the right to recover from
the third-party," citing a long list of Georgia precedents to that
effect. 66
Moreover, the court held that the homeowners' post-loss
Release and Settlement Agreement with the homeowners' carrier,
wherein the carrier waived subrogation rights, was a novation of both
the prior existing policy and proof of loss language by reason of the
merger clause of the Release and Settlement Agreement. 7 Having
run the gamut of arguments, the court applied the collateral source rule,
allowing the homeowners to retain both the first-party insurance
proceeds
for the loss and their legal rights to recover again for the
68
loSS.1

While a prior homeowner may be paid twice for the same loss, this
was not the case in Battle v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,169
where the homeowner, by reason of the federal doctrine of judicial
estoppel, was not able to recover at all for a total loss.17 ° Here, the
homeowner did not list the real property on his bankruptcy schedule,
and over $100,000 of unsecured debt was discharged to the homeowner's
benefit. The homeowner unsuccessfully asserted that his current
homeowner's insurance carriers had not relied upon the bankruptcy
proceedings and thus were not prejudiced by his prior conduct.'
The
court reviewed the federal doctrine of judicial estoppel, long recognized
in Georgia "to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting
parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies

163. Id.
164. Id. at 488 n.2, 623 S.E.2d at 694 n.2.
165. Id. at 490, 623 S.E.2d at 696.
166. Id. at 488-89, 623 S.E.2d at 695.
167. Id. at 489, 623 S.E.2d at 695.
168. Id. at 490, 623 S.E.2d at 696.
169. 276 Ga. App. 434, 623 S.E.2d 541 (2005).
170. Id. at 434, 623 S.E.2d at 542.
171. Id. at 436, 623 S.E.2d at 543.
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of the moment." 17 2 The trial court had discretion in determining where
estoppel is to be applied, and the court reasoned that precedent existed
in Georgia for applying the doctrine where the party seeking estoppel
was not even prejudiced by the prior conduct.' 3 The court emphasized
that the federal doctrine of judicial estoppel is in the nature of a penalty,
and its sole focus is on abuse of the judicial process, not the contractual
commitments that might otherwise exist. 7 4
In Farmer u. Allstate Insurance Co.,"' the court held that where the

homeowner is suspected of fraud and the homeowner's policy language
requires production of detailed documentation, it is insufficient for the
homeowner merely to submit a sworn statement and unilaterally declare
the additional documentation requested to be irrelevant.176 In Farmer
the homeowner's failure to provide adequate documentation constituted
a material breach of the homeowner's contract, entitling Allstate to
summary judgment."' Following a suspicious fire, Allstate required
that the homeowner submit to examination under oath and requested
financial, real estate, and related documentation, including cell phone
records.'7 8 Basing its opinion on the clear terms of the Allstate policy,
which specified that "you must ... give us all accounting records, bills,
invoices and other vouchers, or certified copies, which we may reasonably request to examine,"' 9 Judge Thrash found a material breach in
80
the terms of the policy and awarded summary judgment to Allstate.
This opinion is consistent with others, wherein the policy terms clearly
authorized thorough investigations of suspicious circumstances and the
failure to comply resulted in coverage being forfeited altogethinsured's
8
er.' '

172. Id. at 435, 623 S.E.2d at 543 (citing Period Homes, LTD. v. Wallick, 275 Ga. 486,
488, 569 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2002)). See Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga.
App. 454, 455, 442 S.E.2d 265, 266-67 (1974) for the initial recognition and application of
the doctrine by Georgia courts.
173. Battle, 276 Ga. App. at 435, 623 S.E.2d at 543 (citing Southmark, 212 Ga. App.
at 455, 442 S.E.2d at 265).
174. Id., 623 S.E.2d at 544.
175. 396 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
176. Id. at 1382-83.
177. Id. at 1383.
178. Id. at 1380-81.
179. Id. at 1382.
180. Id. at 1382-83.
181. See generally Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Sorrough, 122 Ga. App. 556, 177 S.E.2d 819
(1970). However, often there are questions of fact regarding compliance where strict
compliance is difficult. See generally Diamonds & Denims, Inc. v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 203
Ga. App. 681, 417 S.E.2d 440 (1992).
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& DISABILITY INSURANCE
Absent ambiguity in terms or a fully developed factual record showing
a dispute, Georgia courts consistently enforce the literal terms of the
policies, not how the courts would have preferred they had been written.
In Guideone Life Insurance Co. v. Ward," 2 the deceased's son was
tendered the premium the day after his father's death, during what
would have been the thirty-one day "grace period." The son was given
an opportunity to prove to a jury that multiple historical slight
overpayments might have extended coverage for the $250,000 life
insurance benefit to the date of his father's death. The deceased's
beneficiary was unable to satisfy the literal terms of the policy's thirtyone day grace period reinstatement, inasmuch as it required a late
premium payment conditioned upon the signature of the deceased, who
was obviously then unavailable to sign."8 3
The court rejected the insured's attempt to negate the cancellation,
which was based on the insurer's failure to notify under O.C.G.A. section
33-24-44.184 The court reasoned that this code section does not relate
to the insured's failure to act, as was the case here.8 5 However, the
insured crafted a winning argument by pointing to past slight overpayments, which were admitted to be at least $20.10 and might have been
as much as $74.25. He only needed $40.76 of historical overpayments,
the amount of a monthly premium, to extend coverage to his father's
death.'8 6 An easier win would have occurred had the reinstatement
provision provided that the policy, once it had lapsed, would only be
reinstated as of the date of late payment. The Authors have encountered
reinstatement provisions to that effect and have successfully advanced
much longer periods of coverage, as all of the reinstatements began on
a later date, that is, the date of payment. The issue was so close that
the court sustained the insurer's partial summary judgment on bad
faith, such that the final decision at
the hands of the jury will be for just
187
VI.

LIFE, HEALTH

what is owed under the contract.

In several opinions, carriers continue to successfully defend their right
to pay life insurance proceeds in accordance with the terms of the
contract, not in accordance with equities as perceived by third-parties.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

275 Ga. App. 1, 619 S.E.2d 723 (2005).
Id. at 2, 619 S.E.2d at 726.
Id. at 2-3, 619 S.E.2d at 726; O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 (2005).
Guideone, 275 Ga. App. at 4-5, 619 S.E.2d at 727-28.
Id. at 5-6, 619 S.E.2d at 728.
Id. at 7-8, 619 S.E.2d at 729.
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McReynolds v. Prudential Insurance Co."" involved yet another
ex-spouse trying to get to the proceeds of a life insurance policy claimed
to be intended for her benefit.'89 Despite the ex-spouse's prior communications indicating an appreciation of her interest in the policy, the
court rejected her promissory estoppel claim.' 90 The court reasoned
that Prudential could not have reasonably expected she would rely on its
acknowledgment of her concerns and that her own reliance was
unreasonable. 9 ' The court reiterated that "'[an insurance company
that has had no business dealings with a third party to the insurance
policy owes no duty ' to192that party to investigate the accuracy of the
policy's designations. "
19
Similarly, in Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Heveder, 3
the court held that the deceased's widow was properly paid the proceeds
of the life insurance policy, even though she was alleged to be a
conspirator in the deceased's murder.'
The court concluded this
despite the carrier's prepayment investigation indicating that the widow
was a potential suspect and would not cooperate with authorities.' 95
Expressly adopting the rationale of the Alabama Supreme Court in Alfa
Life Insurance Corp. v.Culverhouse,9 6 the court applied O.C.G.A. section 33-24-41197 literally, which in pertinent part provides that payments shall fully discharge the insurer"unless, before payment is made,
the insurer has received at its home office written notice [of the
claimant's entitlement under the policy]."'98 The court determined
that written notice was not timely provided.'9 9 Complaints should20 0be
taken up with "the General Assembly to consider, not [the] Court."
Another insurer followed a safer and less controversial approach to
such a dispute in Cantera v. American Heritage Life Insurance Co.,201
an interpleader action. In Cantera the husband of the deceased was

188. 276 Ga. App. 747, 624 S.E.2d 218 (2005).
189, Id. at 747, 624 S.E.2d at 219.
190. Id. at 749-50, 624 S.E.2d at 221.
191. Id. at 750-51, 624 S.E.2d at 221-22.
192. Id. at 752, 624 S.E.2d at 222 (quoting Lee v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 241 Ga. App. 650,
651-52, 530 S.E.2d 727, 729-30 (1999)).
193. 274 Ga. App. 377, 618 S.E.2d 39 (2005).
194. Id. at 377-80, 618 S.E.2d at 40-42.
195. Id. at 377-78, 618 S.E.2d at 40.
196. 729 So. 2d 325 (Ala. 1999) (reasoning that if the court were to agree with the
appellee's argument, it would in effect be disregarding the statute's plain language).
197. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41 (2005).
198. Id.; Colonial Life, 274 Ga. App. at 379, 618 S.E.2d at 41.
199. Colonial Life, 274 Ga. App. at 379, 618 S.E.2d at 41.
200. Id. at 380, 618 S.E.2d at 41.
201. 274 Ga. App. 307, 617 S.E.2d 259 (2005).
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named as a beneficiary but was also a suspect in her murder. Even so,
the widower sought to recover the insurance proceeds from his wife's life
insurance policy, and he filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial
court initially denied the widower's motion without explanation, but
three years later, the widower moved for summary judgment again. In
the affidavit accompanying his second motion for summary judgment,
the widower averred that he did not kill his wife. This time, the trial
court granted the widower's motion. The deceased's children appealed,
arguing that their father was directly involved in their mother's
death. 20 2 In this fact-intensive opinion, the court of appeals held that
the husband's statements alleging that he did not kill his wife were
insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment because they
were self-serving and conclusory.2 °3
The court identified sufficient
disputed facts in the record to require jury consideration of the issues
existing between the deceased's children and husband.0 4
In Giddens v.Equitable Life Assurance, °5 the Eleventh Circuit gave
the parties to this long-running disability dispute "the final answer."
The court ultimately held that policy language concerning "'[the
insured's] inability due to injury or sickness to engage in the substantial
2 6 was ambiguous. 2 7
and material duties of [his] regular occupation'"
The Eleventh Circuit carefully picked through Equitable's policy
language,08 given the unique facts pertaining to this dentist and real
estate developer, and dispatched of Dr. Giddens's Residual Disability
Claim for the practice of general dentistry.2 9 Dr. Giddens gave up the
practice in 1994, but he was not disabled until 1998, and the policy
required that occupation be practiced "regularly" at the time of the
disability.2 0 Following the Eighth Circuit in Dowdle v. Natural Life
Insurance Co.,211 the court held that the policy's failure to quantify, for
purposes of Total Disability, the extent of the inability to engage in the
substantial and material duties of regular occupation created an
ambiguity. 12 The medical evidence uncontrovertibly established that
Dr. Giddens was unable to perform the majority of his then regular

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 307-10, 617 S.E.2d at 259-61.
Id. at 311, 617 S.E.2d at 262.
Id. at 312, 617 S.E.2d at 262.
445 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1292-93, 1297, 1298.
Id. at 1292-93.
Id.
407 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Minnesota law).
Giddens, 445 F.3d at 1298.
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occupation of real estate development.213 While Equitable interprets
its policy language to mean that Giddens must be unable to perform all
of his substantial and material duties before recovering under its policy,
the court held that this does not render the language unambiguous.2 14
The court did, however, acknowledge that Equitable's interpretation
(inability to perform all) was reasonable.21 5 The court also noted that
Equitable's problem was that the insured also had a reasonable
interpretation of the same policy language. 2 6 The insured interpreted
the language to mean that an insured must have an inability to perform
most or the majority of the substantial and material duties before an
insured could claim total disability.2
The court concluded that the
provision was ambiguous and, therefore, must be interpreted against
Equitable.2 " The "final answer" may well lead Equitable to revisit its
policy language in such contracts.
VII.

MISCELLANEOUS

In 2006 diligent consumers found it difficult to comply with policy
requirements that called for consumers to bring suit within twelve
months. In response, the Georgia Insurance Commissioner promulgated
Temporary Emergency Regulations that changed the one-year suit
requirement in the Standard Fire Policy and Unfair Claims Settlement
Act and imposed a two-year minimum time limitation for filing suit on
a policy.219
These regulations were made permanent by order of
Commissioner Oxendine on September 21, 2006. As illustrated by Rain
& Hail Insurance Services, Inc. v. Vickery, 2 ° this type of contractual
provision that limits bringing insurance actions to "12 months of the
date of denial of the claim" has been consistently enforced, yet strictly
construed, because failure to comply results in a forfeiture of an
otherwise paid-for policy benefit. 22' Indeed, in Rain & Hail the court
strained to find factual issues for jury resolution as the insurer's
construction of the Rain & Hail policy would have resulted in no
coverage for any crop.222 Additionally, the court in Rain & Hail joined

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-19-.01-0.20 (2006); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-200.21 (2006).
220. 274 Ga. App. 424, 618 S.E.2d 111 (2005).
221. Id. at 425, 618 S.E.2d at 113.
222. Id. at 425-32, 618 S.E.2d at 113-17.
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the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Williams Farms of Homestead, Inc. v.
Rain & Hail Insurance Services, Inc.22 ' and other courts in holding
that a private insurer (though partially reinsured by the FCIC) does not
immunity-from-estoppel privileges granted the governmental
enjoy the
224
agency.

223.
224.

121 F.3d 630, 635 (11th Cir. 1997).
Rain & Hail, 274 Ga. App. at 430-31, 618 S.E.2d at 116-17.

